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and the court finding that notice of the hearing of said 
petition has been given w ____________ as required by law;'' 
and ordering that respondent be appointed guardian "upon 
his giving a bond ... , and taking and subscribing 
the oath required by law.'' His oath was dated April 30, 
1942. On the same day, respondent filed a verified petition, 
in which he described himself as the ''duly appointed, quali-
fied and acting guardian of the estate of the above named 
minors,'' asking that an order be made permitting him as guar-
dian to sell the property of the guardianship estate. His letters 
of guardianship were not issued until five days later, May 5, 
1942. Notice of hearing on the petition for permission to 
sell ·was posted at the court house and published three times 
in a local newspaper. 'fhe rc>eorct ,]oes not reveal any notice 
of a place where offers or bids \HHdd be reeeived. (Prob. 
Code, § § 1534, 780, 782.) F'urther, there is no record that 
an appraisal was made. (Pro b. Code, § 784.) The only state-
ment of the value of the property that appears in the record 
was that made by respondent in his petition. He alleged 
therein that the rental value of the property was not suffieient 
to pay taxes, upkeep, and the interest on the debt of $13,206.25, 
seemed by the trust deed to Yasabura; that the property was 
not worth more than $6,000; and that he had received an 
offer in that amount. It was further alleged in the petition 
that IIiroko had attained her majority "but that there will 
be no money to go into the guardianship from the sale of 
this property for the reason that the ::;aid property is encum-
bered with a trust deed in favor of Y. Kawakita ... and that 
therefore the wards have no equity whatever, and [respondent] 
therefore thinks that it will be for the best interests of this 
estate that the building be sold and the estate closed.'' The 
petition for permission to sell was subsequently granted, and 
a sale was consummated to John T. Rashid for $6,000. Sinee 
the amount due on the trust deed was greater than the sale 
price, the guardianship estate received nothing from the sale. 
The $6,000 less the costs of the sale, were deposited in the 
"blocked" bank aecount of Yasabura, pursuant to a license 
issued by the United States Department of the Treasury. The 
guardian's annual reports for 1943 and 1944 were approved, 
but the estate was not elosed until October 2, 1946, when the 
court diseharged the guardian and ordered the assets of the 
estate-$329.68-distributed to the wards. 
Tomoya returned to the United States in 1946. He was 
thereafter in dieted for and eonvieted of treason. Judgment 
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order and that therefore we have no jurisdiction to review 
these contentions in this proceeding. 
[1] Section 1630 of the Probate Code provides that ".An 
appeal may be taken to the Supreme Court from an order 
granting or revoking letters of guardianship ; settling an ac-
count of a guardian ; instructing or directing a guardian; or 
refusing to make any order heretofore mentioned in this 
section.'' With the possible exception of an order granting 
a new trial (see Estate of Armstrong, 8 Cal.2d 204, 206 [64 
P.2d 1093]), it is settled that only those orders mentioned in 
section 1630 are appealable in guardianship proceedings. 
(Guardianship of Leach, 29 Cal.2d 535, 539 [176 P .2d 369] ; 
Estate of Kay, 30 Cal.2d 215, 217 [181 P.2d 1]; see also 
Kramer v. Superior Court, 36 Cal.2d 159, 161 [222 P.2d 874] ; 
Fredrickson v. Superior Coud, 38 Cal.2d 593, 596-597 [241 
P .2d 541].) [2] That section does not mention an appeal 
from an order either granting or denying a motion to vacate 
or annul a prior order of the court. Accordingly, an appeal 
may be taken from such an order only if in legal effect it is 
tantamount to one or more of the orders listed. (See Lyon 
v. Goss, 19 Cal.2d 659, 670 [123 P.2d 11] ; Estate of Estrern, 
16 CaJ.2d 563, 566 [107 P.2d 36] .) If respondent's letters 
of guardianship were still in effect it might reasonably 
be contended that the court's order refusing to vacate and 
annul the order appointing him guardian was tantamount to 
an order refusing to revoke letters of guardianship. (See 
In re Dahnke, 64 Cal.App. 555, 559 [222 P. 381] ; Estate of 
Estrern, supra, 16 Cal.2d 563, 566; cf., Guardianship of Bra-
zeal, 117 Cal..App.2d 59, 60 [254 P.2d 886] .) [3] In the 
present case, however, respondent was discharged as guardian 
approximately four years before this proceeding was com-
menced, and accordingly his letters are no longer in effect 
and could not now be revoked by any order to vacate and 
annul. Nor is the order appealed from equivalent to any of 
the other orders listed in section 1630. 
The appeal is dismissed. 
Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Schauer, J., and Spence J., con-
curred. 
CARTER, J.-1 dissent. 
The majority has seen fit to dismiss this appeal upon the 
sole ground that the order appealed from is not an appealable 
order. Such a decision is not only erroneous and misleading 
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but is based upon an inadequate analysis of section 1630 of 
the Probate Code. 
It is well recognized in California that the right of appeal 
in probate matters is purely statutory and exists only in those 
cases in which it is given by statute. (Estate of Funkenstein, 
170 Cal. 594 [150 P. 987]; In re Walkerly, 94 Cal. 352 [29 
P. 719] .) It is equally well recognized that the right to appeal 
in guardianship matters is governed exclusively by Probate 
Code, section 1630. (Guardianship of Leach, 29 Cal.2d 535 
[176 P.2d 369] .) 
In the case at bar the appellants appealed from an order 
denying a motion "to vacate, annul and declare void" the 
appointment of a guardian. Since such an order has to do with 
guardianship proceedings it can only be appealed from if 
provision for such appeal has been made by section 1630 of 
the Probate Code. It therefore becomes apparent that the 
appealability or nonappealability of the instant order is de-
pendent upon the provisions of section 1630 of the Probate 
Code. 
Section 1630 of the Probate Code provides that ''An appeal 
may be taken to the Supreme Court from an order granting 
or revoking letters of guardianship; settling an account of a 
guardian ; instructing or directing a guardian ; or refusing· to 
make any order heretofore mentioned in this section." (Em-
phasis added.) This section makes it unquestionably clear 
that an appeal may be taken from an order granting or re-
voking letters of guardianship and that an appeal may also 
be taken from a refusal to make either of these orders. Thus 
an order revoking letters of guardianship is an appealable 
order. Likewise an order refusing to revoke letters of guar-
dianship is also an appealable order. We therefore find that 
section 1630 of the Probate Code makes express provision for 
the appeal of an order refusing to revoke letters of guardian-
ship. Not only does section 1630 expressly provide for the 
appeal of orders refusing to revoke letters of g'Uardianship 
but the appeal of such orders has long been the accepted prac-
tice in California. (In re Morhoff, 179 Cal. 595 l178 P. 294]; 
111atter of Schwartz, 171 Cal. 633 [154 P. 304]; Guardianship 
of Rapp, 54 Cal.App.2d 461 [ 129 P.2d 130].) The rule in 
California is well established that "An appeal may be taken 
from a judgment or order of the superior court granting or 
refusing to grant, revoking or refusing to revoke, letters of 
guardianship; ... " (13 Cal.Jur. 167.) 
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determined that an order refusing to revoke letters 
of is an order, we must now deter-
mine whether in the instant ease the order in question was one 
whieh refused to revoke letters of guardianship. Looking 
to appellants' motion oE October 1950, we find that they 
sought to "vacate, annul and declare void the order of this 
eourt [probate eourt] made in this proceeding, on May 5, 1942, 
appointing \V. II. Lorenz [respondent] a guardian of the 
estates of said Hiroko Kawakita and Tomoya Kawakita, ... '' 
This order of May 5, 1942, which appellants sought to vacate 
was entitled '' r~ETTERS OF GuARDIANSHIP', anrl it provided 
among other things that "\V. H. Lorenz is hereby appointed 
guardian of" the estate of Hiroko and Tomoya Kawakita. 
'l'his means that appellants sought to vacate the order of 
May 5, 1942, by ·which letters of guardianship were granted 
to respondent. 'rhe court's refusal to make such an order, 
vacating the order of May 5, 1942, was clearly a refusal to 
"vacate, annul and declare void" the letters of guardianship. 
If an order refusing to "vacate, annul and declare void" is 
the same thing as an order refusing to "revoke" then the 
instant order refusing to vacate the letters of guardianship 
is without question an appealable order within the provisions 
of section 1630 of the Probate Code. 
In comparing the word "revoke" with the word "vacate" 
we find that the courts of this country have frequently held 
the two terms to be synonymous (People ex rel. Filippone v. 
Martin, 46 N.Y.S.2d 234, 235). As for comparing the word 
"revoke" with the word "annul" we find that to revoke is "to 
annul by recalling or taking back; ... An annulling; a can-
cellation .... " ·webster's New International Dictionary, 
second ed., 1933, unabridged.) In Black's Law Dietionary 
(third eel, 1933) it is stated that "revoke" means "To call 
back; to recall; to annul an act by calling or taking it back.'' 
The courts of this country have been in accord ·with such defi-
nitions. (Bmun Estate, 358 Pa. 271 [56 A.2d 201]; Mayor, 
etc., of Houston v. Houston City St. Ry. Co., 83 Tex. 548 [19 
S.W. 127]; ]i'orcl v. Greenawalt, 292 Ill. 121 [126 N.E. 555] .) 
It is equally well established that the word "revoke" means 
to "declare void." (O'Hagen v. Kracke, 165 Misc. 4 [300 
N.Y.S. 351, 362] ; In re Will of Barrie, 393 Il1. 111 [65 N.E.2d 
433] ; Commissioner af Internal ReventLe v. Holmes' Estate, 
148 F .2d 7 40, 7 42.) In California our courts have frequently 
used such terms as ''revoke,'' ''vacate'' and ''set aside'' inter-
changeably. (Gtlarcliansh1:p of Van Loan, 142 Cal. 423 ['76 P. 
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37); In re Morhoff, st£pra, 179 Cal. 595; Estate of Eikeren-
kotter, 126 Cal. 54 [58 P. 370J; In re Dahnke, 64 Cal.App. 555 
[222 P. 381].) It thus becomes apparent that a motion to 
''vacate, annul and declare void'' is the equivalent of a 
motion to ''revoke.'' 
In the case at bar the appellants sought to "vacate, annul 
and declare void'' the letters of guardianship of respondent. 
This was in effect a motion to revoke such letters. 'l'he order 
of the probate court refusing to revoke such letters of guar-
dianship was clearly and unequivocally an appealable order 
within the provisions of section 1630 of the Probate Code. 
The net result is that the order appealed from is an appeal-
able order and it is incumbent upon this court to decide the 
case upon its merits. The mere fact that the guardian was 
previously discharged is immaterial since the order to revoke 
and vacate because of an absence of jurisdiction does more 
tban merely discharge a guardian, it goes back and cancels 
all proceedings based upon such appointment. It is well 
established that an order of the court which, as here, is void 
on its face can be set aside at any time. (In re Dahnke, 
s1tpra, 64 Cal.App. 555; People v. Greene, 74 Cal. 400 [16 P. 
197, 5 Am.St.Rep. 448]; Estate of Estrem, 16 Cal.2d 563 
r107 P.2d 36].) 
In the case at bar the lower court committed a patent and 
obvious error in refusing to revoke the letters of guardian-
ship since the record of the order of appointment was void 
on its face. The valid appointment of a guardian for a minor 
requires that notice of the appointment proceedings be given 
to the parents of the minor, or alternatively, proof must be 
made that such notice cannot be given. It is also requisite 
that the appointment be "necessary or convenient." (Prob. 
Code, §§ 1440, 1441.) In the instant case no notice was given 
to the parents of Hiroko and Tomoya and an appointment 
made without such notice is a nullity. (In re Dahnke, St(pra, 64 
Cal.App. 555; Guardianship of Kerns, 74 Cal.App.2d 862 
[169 P.2d 975] ; Guardianship of Van Loan, s~lpra, 142 Cal. 
423.) The record also indicates that the appointment was 
nrither necessary nor convenient since at the time the letters 
of guardianship were issued the record before the court 
showed that the property of the estate was worth less than 
$6,000; that liabilities amounted to more than $13,000; and 
that therefore Hiroko and Tomoya had "no equity whatever" 
in the property which was to constitute the guardianship 
estate. The law in California is well established that an order 
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appointing a guardian of the person and estate of a minor may 
be vacated at any time, if the record of the appointment dis-
closes affirmatively upon its face that the order was void 
for want of jurisdiction of the court to make it. (Estate of 
Eikerenkotter, sttpra, 126 Cal. 54.) It thus becomes apparent 
that the order which appellants sought to revoke was a nullity 
and should have been set aside. 
For these reasons I would reverse the order appealed from 
with directions to enter an order setting aside the order ap-
pointing respondent guardian of these petitioners and all 
subsequent orders based thereon. 
Appellants' petition for a rehearing was denied June 23, 
1954. Carter, J., was of the opinion that the petition should 
be granted. 
[L. A. No. 22493. In Bank. May 28, 1954.] 
HIROKO KAWAKITA HAYASHI et al., Appellants, v. 
W. H. lJORENZ et al., Respondents. 
[1] Dismissal-Failure to Prosecute-Discretion of Court.-"Dis-
cretion" within Code Civ. Proc., § 583, authorizing court in 
its discretion to dismiss action for want of prosecution, is 
discretion of trial court, and it will be disturbed only in cases 
of manifest abuse. 
[2] Judgments-Opening and Vacating-Time for Application for 
Relief.-A judgment or order which is void on its face, and 
which requires only an inspection of judgment roll or record 
to show its invalidity, may be set aside on motion at any time 
after its entry by court which rendered the judgment or made 
the order. 
[3] Dismissal-Failure to Prosecute-Excuse for Delay.-Where 
validity of orders in guardianship proceedings can be attacked 
at any time, proceedings instituted by wards' motions to 
vacate orders in guardianship matter provide no excuse for 
[1] See Cal.Jur., Dismissal, Discontinuance and Nonsuit, § 20; 
Am.Jur., Dismissal, Discontinuance and Nonsuit, §57. 
[2] Lapse of time as bar to action or proceeding for relief in 
respect of void judgment, note, 154 A.L.R. 818. See, also, Cal.Jur., 
Judgments, § 111; Am.Jur., Judgments, § 727 et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Dismissal,§§ 38, 40; [2] Judgments, 
§ 189; [ 3, 8] Dismissal, § 45; [ 4] Prisons and Prisoners, § 19; 
[5-7] Prisons and Prisoners, § 20; [9] Dismissal, §59. 
